A fine mess: bricolaged forest governance in Cameroon by Ingram, V.J. et al.
International Journal of the Commons
Vol. 9, no 1 xxxx 2015, pp. xxx–xxx
Publisher: Uopen Journals
URL:http://www.thecommonsjournal.org
URN:NBN:NL:UI:10-1-xxxxxx
Copyright: content is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License
ISSN: 1875-0281
A fine mess: bricolaged forest governance in Cameroon
Verina Ingram
Sustainable Markets and Chains, LEI, Wageningen UR, The Netherlands 
Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR), Indonesia
verina.ingram@wur.nl
Mirjam A.F. Ros-Tonen
Amsterdam Institute for Social Science Research-Governance and Inclusive Development 
Group (AISSR-GID), Department of Human Geography, Planning and International Develop-
ment Studies, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands
m.a.f.ros-tonen@uva.nl
Ton Dietz
African Studies Centre, The Netherlands
Amsterdam Institute of Social Science Research-Governance and Inclusive Development Group 
(AISSR-GID), Department of Human Geography, Planning and International Development 
Studies, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands
dietzaj@ascleiden.nl
Abstract: Value chains of Cameroonian non-timber forest products move 
through harvesters, processors and traders, to consumers locally and worldwide. 
This paper characterises six governance arrangements governing eight such 
chains: statutory and customary regulations, voluntary market-based systems, 
international conventions, project-based systems and corruption. Governance 
is messy with overlapping, multiple layers of institutions and actors. There are 
voids where no institutions govern access to resources and markets; some actors 
fulfil roles normally the reserve of the state. In some chains the state performs 
its duties, in others not, and other institutions fill the gaps. To negotiate this 
complexity, many actors have become adept ‘bricoleurs’. They make the best 
of the arrangements in which they find themselves, and creatively use capitals 
available, building on natural capital to construct new governance arrangements 
and/or remould existing ones to meet their current objectives, circumstances and 
livelihoods. This ‘fine mess’ makes examining the impacts on the livelihoods 
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of participants and their sustainability challenging. A measure of governance 
intensity and extensive fieldwork was thus used to research this. Results indicate 
strong trade-offs between natural, social and economic capital, creating winners 
and losers. Trade-offs between livelihoods and sustainability are most acute 
either when there are no governance arrangements; when arrangements do not 
take account of the susceptibility of a species to harvesting; or when they do 
not balance supply and demand. Policy challenges and opportunities include 
recognising and dealing with pluralism; reconciling conflicting rules; hearing the 
voices of silent stakeholders; learning from failures and raising chain visibility by 
recognising natural and socio-economic values. 
Keywords: Bricolage, Cameroon, forest governance, institutions, livelihoods, 
non-timber forest products, value chains
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1. Introduction
Leaves and nuts from Cameroon’s vast lowland humid forests; honey, bamboos 
and gum arabic from the savannah; and barks, honey, raffia, bamboo and cola nuts 
from the mountain forests have been used for centuries. These non-timber forest 
products (NTFPs) are of biological origin and derived from natural, modified 
or managed forested landscapes and wooded land and trees outside forests 
(Belcher 2003; Ros-Tonen and Wiersum 2005). They are used for subsistence, 
medicine, food, energy, tools and cultural uses. They have been traded near and 
far, generating cash and creating markets currently worth over 32 million US$ 
annually (Ingram 2012). A forest value chain denotes the people and organisations 
(termed ‘actors’) and activities involved. 
These products move and change in value and substance from the forest 
through harvesters, to processors, traders, and retailers to consumers in Cameroon 
and worldwide. The chains operate in dynamic, changing and complex settings. 
Whilst the harvest zones in Cameroon are characterised by persistent poverty and 
low levels of infrastructure, in urban areas people have been gradually becoming 
wealthier. Their social and economic development has increased, stimulating 
economic growth (de Wasseige et al. 2012). Forests are increasingly cleared for 
agriculture, urbanisation, infrastructure and for timber and mineral extraction 
(de Wasseige et al. 2012).
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Livelihood benefits from NTFP harvesting and trade have been widely 
acknowledged, but the sustainability thereof is subject to concern (Sunderland 
et al. 2011). Overharvesting has been amply reported (Cunningham 2001; 
Ticktin 2004; Marshall et al. 2006). Governing NTFP chains for sustainability is 
therefore necessary to guarantee long-term livelihood security to actors involved 
in the chain. A livelihood is deemed sustainable when it can cope with risks and 
recover from stresses, shocks and when it is capable of maintaining or enhancing 
capabilities and ‘capital’ (human, economic, social-cultural, physical, political 
and natural), both now and in the future (Chambers and Conway 1991). Due to the 
diversity of products and contexts there is however no ‘one-size-fits-all’ solution 
for sustainable NTFP management (Ticktin and Shackleton 2011). This raises the 
question of how different governance arrangements are combined into context- 
and product-specific configurations and how these affect the sustainability of 
livelihoods, trade and resource management. This paper addresses this question 
for eight NTFP chains from Cameroon.
The term chain governance was coined to denote the relations and relative 
powers between actors along the chain (FAO 2007). Governance is defined here as 
the interactive process of rule-making embedded in a broader societal process based 
on social practices, values and principles (Wiersum et al. 2013). It comprises the 
mechanisms and processes by which (a) people and groups articulate their interests, 
(b) authority is conferred on rulers, (c) they make, enforce, modify and sanction 
the rules, and (d) rights and obligations are exercised (Ostrom 1990). Governance 
arrangements are the interplay of interactions, institutions, actors, principles, policies, 
mechanisms and processes (Bavinck and Kooiman 2005) and may not always be 
an integrated system. Institutions enable and shape individual, group and social 
expectations, interactions and behaviour through the rules, norms and processes that 
define how people interrelate and act within and outside of organisations (UNDP 
1997; Bavinck et al. 2005, 2013). These institutions can change over time or space, 
be formal or informal, and are interlinked with knowledge, power and control.
Concepts of regulatory and legal pluralism (Wollenberg et al. 2001; Tamanaha 
2008) and multilevel governance (Mwangi and Wardell 2012) acknowledge 
plural statutory and customary governance on different levels. The picture is 
however yet more complex in practice, with multiple systems shaping chain 
activities and different actors introducing, influencing and shaping institutions, 
values and norms. The term ‘institutional bricolage’ (Cleaver 2002) was coined to 
analyse this complexity. It refers to the cross-cultural borrowing of institutional 
arrangements and their underlying norms, values and social relationships, and 
the crafting of new arrangements. This leads to multipurpose institutions and 
arrangements that foster cooperation and advance livelihoods, individually and 
collectively (Cleaver 2002). The term bricolage1
 (Lévi-Strauss 1966), refers to 
making do with whatever is at hand. It has also been used for bringing together 
1
 From the French for ‘fiddle’ or ‘tinker’ or to do-it-yourself, making creative use of whatever 
materials are available to complete a task, regardless of their original purpose.
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diverse theoretical and philosophical human sciences concepts (Kincheloe 2001). 
Productive bricolage focuses on livelihoods as the flexible and dynamic crafting 
of livelihood options and associated impacts on landscapes (Ros-Tonen 2012). 
Literature capturing and making explicit how different governance 
arrangements occur and interact over time, place and for different forest products 
and their markets, is scarce. In particular there is no method to measure the strength 
or intensity of different configurations of (plural) governance arrangements. Such 
a method can illustrate contrasting impacts of governance arrangements, as well 
as the nature of competing claims over access to NTFP resources and markets, 
and measure these in both a qualitative and quantitative way. This is important, 
because, as Ribot and colleagues (2006, 1878) state, “the multiple, competing and 
sometimes violently conflicting claims over forests resources (…) eviscerate the 
ability of any authority to protect [them]”. 
Against the context of poverty and forest degradation, and the conceptual 
notions above, the aim of this paper is to disentangle the ‘fine mess’2 of the 
arrangements governing eight NTFPs value chains originating in Cameroon. In 
doing so it aims to contribute to critical institutionalism theory (Cleaver 2012) 
that seeks to illuminate the complexity of institutions in everyday life, their 
formation, and the interplay between traditional and modern, formal and informal 
arrangements. 
2. Methods
Case studies of eight NTFP chains were conducted in Cameroon between 2004 
and 2010: eru (Gnetum spp.), apiculture products originating from the African bee 
(Apis mellifera adansonii), pygeum (Prunus africana), cola nuts (Cola spp.), bush 
mango (Irvingia spp.), raffia products (Raphia spp.), bamboos (Yushania alpina 
and Oxytenanthera abyssinica) and gum arabic (three Acacia spp.). These chains 
were selected from a list of over 700 NTFP species identified based on literature 
review, trade data, and observation in markets and key respondent interviews 
from harvesters to consumers in the major production areas. Criteria guiding the 
selection of chains included (i) high economic and social value, (ii) having local, 
national and international chains, (iii) having different types of arrangements and 
(iv) having Cameroon’s major ecological zones represented. The latter include 
the Afromontane forests in the Northwest and Southwest regions, the Sudano-
Zambezian savannah forests of Adamaoua and Extreme North regions, and the 
Guineo-Congolian lowland humid forests in the Southwest, Centre, Littoral and 
East regions (Figure 1). 
2
 Silent, silver screen actors Stan Laurel and Oliver Hardy coined the catchphrase “This is another 
fine mess you’ve gotten us into”. Similarly NTFP chain actors often have little or no voice in formal 
governance and act to create their own ‘messy’ arrangements that work well for them. ‘Fine’ in 
Cameroonian pidgin means ‘good’ or ‘well’. The phrase implies both negative and positive impacts 
simultaneously.
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In-depth data on the eight chains was gathered through semi-structured 
interviews with 2,113 direct actors (harvesters, processors, traders, retailers, 
their associations and consumers) and 82 indirect stakeholders (customary 
and regulatory authorities; research, nongovernmental, civil society, project, 
multilateral and bilateral organisations; convention and certification agencies; 
and service providers). The interviews covered product characteristics, sources 
and uses, actors, activities, values, governance arrangements, livelihoods and 
sustainability aspects. A literature review, situational analysis (adapted from 
Steenburgh and Avery 2010) of ecological, socio-economic and entrepreneurial 
operating contexts and prevailing governance arrangements, and trade data 
helped increase data validity. Impacts were assessed using value chain analysis 
(Kaplinsky and Morris 2000) and participatory action research (McNiff and 
Whitehead 2002). Botanic inventories and assessments allowed an assessment of 
the resources and sustainability of harvesting. Quantitative data from the surveys 
and interviews was processed using SPSS.
A review of governance indicators (Graham et al. 2003; Hyden et al. 2008; 
Ribot et al. 2008; Ibrahim Foundation 2010; Kaufmann et al. 2010; World Bank 
2010) and institutional design principles (Ostrom 1990; Scott 2001; Agrawal and 
Chhatre 2006; Cox et al. 2010) yielded twelve indicators (Table 1). Based on the 
results of interviews, situational analysis and value chain analyses for each chain, 
six governance arrangements were identified and scored, with their existence and 
intensity rated along a continuum from strong (10) to non-existent (0) (Table 1). In 
between the five scores are gradations where some, but not all of the criteria were 
Figure 1: Research sites of NTFP chains in Cameroon.
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met. The scores for the indicators were averaged for each governance arrangement 
and summarised diagrammatically to enable product comparison across chains 
(Figure 2). A panel of academics and practitioners (see acknowledgements) 
verified the scoring method and results, which were subsequently adjusted taking 
their feedback into account. 
Three of the indicators in Table 1 (no. 1, 3, and 9) were used to measure 
the legitimacy of the governance arrangement. Legitimacy is defined as 
acknowledgement of the existence of a governance arrangement, belief in its 
moral grounding and compliance with rules, which is associated with reduced 
costs of enforcement and compliance (Kooiman et al. 2005). The average score of 
the three indicators for each governance arrangement in a chain provides a basis 
for ranking their legitimacy. 
3. Results
The following six types of governance arrangements were found to exist in the 
chains. 
3.1. Statutory arrangements
Statutory frameworks are well-known governance arrangements. In the 1990s 
international agencies, particularly the World Bank, pressured the government to 
promote laws incorporating forest products and services other than just timber. 
Figure 2: Intensity and presence of governance arrangements in eight NTFP chains from 
Cameroon.
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These processes culminated in the 1994 Forestry and Wildlife Law 94/01 and its 
implementing Decree 95/53-PM of 1995. Up to sixteen special forestry products 
(produits spéciaux forestiers)3 have been listed annually since 2006,4 around 13 
of which are NTFPs. These products represent “a particular interest to Cameroon” 
and so are regulated through annual demand-based agreements (gré à gré) and 
quotas, exploitation permits, export authorisations and transport waybills (lettre 
de voiture). However well-intentioned, the 94/01 law was developed without 
adequate or meaningful consultation with people using and trading NTFPs. It has 
since proved largely ineffectual and often undermines the objectives it sought to 
achieve (Mvondo-Assembe 2009). Despite provisions to define harvesting and 
inventory norms, none have been implemented. The statutory framework is poorly 
defined, illogical, inconsistently applied and randomly enforced. This results in a 
few highly traded products being strongly regulated, such as pygeum, and a few 
that are regulated occasionally, such as eru and bush mango. Most NTFPs are not 
regulated, including the well-known and ancient trade in cola, bamboo and raffia 
(Laird et al. 2010). Since 2010 the 1994 law has been subject to an extensive 
consultation process for its revision, only now nearing completion.
3.2. Customary arrangements
The de jure reality is that forests are largely customarily governed. This makes 
people living in and using forests, according to formal regulations, squatters 
on government-owned land and forests (Alden Wily 2011). These forests are 
subdivided by clan, family and individual ownership. Use rights are governed 
through complex systems of short and long-term leases, loans, gifts and 
inheritances, which may differ depending on which ethnic group dominates 
access to the resource. These customary norms determine who owns resources 
and may access them; where and in which quantities harvesting may take place; 
and who benefits and how. Although customary use rights differ across Cameroon, 
in general harvesting NTFPs on land held by a clan or family may take place only 
with the family’s permission. On communal lands any member of a community 
can harvest products for subsistence use, but for high value products for sale (such 
as pygeum, eru and bush mango), approval is generally required from the chief or 
village council. Outsiders often require permission to harvest and in kind or cash 
compensation before or after harvesting. In some communities, conflicts occurred 
when such proceeds were not used to benefit the wider community.
3.3. Market-based governance
Market-based governance refers to institutions controlling demand and supply 
transactions in chains and the interactions between actors. An example is the 
3
 Article 9 of 94/01Law.
4
 Decision No 0336/D/MINFOF 6 July 2006 ‘Setting the List of Special Forestry Products represent-
ing a particular interest to Cameroon’.
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creation of unions and associations that regulate access to markets by making 
membership conditional for market access. Other examples include traditional 
tontines or njangi groups that provide access to credit. Harvesters and retailers 
in the eru, bush mango and honey chains, and many harvesters engaged in such 
groups. At transnational level examples found were voluntary certification 
schemes in the honey chain such as the Geographical Indication (GI). This is a 
voluntary scheme, regulated by EU Directives, which promotes the quality and 
authenticity of products based on their geographical location and culture.
3.4. Standards and agreements
Another governance layer is formed by international standards incorporated into 
national law and voluntarily complied with by states, which generally become 
obligatory for chain actors. They are dynamic and reflect species status and social-
economic and political developments over time. They include the IUCN Red List 
of Threatened Species, which has triggered conservation actions from NGOs, 
governments and researchers (Thompson 2009). The Convention on International 
Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) is an international 
agreement between governments, to which Cameroon acceded in 1981. Legally 
binding on its parties, it provides a framework for implementation within national 
legislation. The Convention on Biological Diversity was ratified by Cameroon in 
1994. It aims to conserve biological diversity and ensure fair and equitable sharing 
of the benefits arising from the utilisation of genetic resources for countries and 
communities, establishing a system for access and benefit sharing. These rules 
are enshrined in a National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan, developed and 
heavily supported by donors. Pygeum, eru and honey were addressed, but despite 
studies and recommendations, regulations enacting the convention have not been 
implemented. 
3.5. Project-based arrangements
Cameroon has become a donor darling and playground for experimentation 
by projects and programmes (Topa et al. 2009). These collaborative activities 
are planned to achieve a particular aim, constituted by teams within or across 
organisations to accomplish particular tasks within a specific timeframe. They are 
funded by governments, international charities, development and not-for-profit 
organisations through grants or loans to implementing organisations. Projects have 
ranged from product-specific, short-term activities to decades of interventions 
covering large geographical areas. Each donor and implementer has its own 
objectives and associated rules, which added layers of governance arrangements 
and significantly influenced NTFP governance in the study areas (Sharpe 1998; 
Abbot et al. 2001; Owono 2001; Brockington and Igoe 2006; Ingram et al. 2011). 
Projects compensated for deficiencies and voids in state services, particularly in 
protected areas. When projects were active for long periods, the state had little 
incentive to engage in governance in these areas. Projects created new institutions 
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– some building on customary rules, new formal regulations and protected areas. 
By doing so, they aided new NTFP value chains and actors and stimulated 
innovations in harvesting, cultivation, processing and commercialisation.
3.6. Institutionalised corruption
Corruption – defined as the exercise of power for private gain – is the manifestation 
of a lack of respect of both the corrupter and corrupted for rules governing their 
interactions. When corruption results in malgovernance or misgovernance, it 
creates another governance arrangement than that intended (Pillay 2004). ‘Dash’, 
a Cameroonian pidgin term for bribery, was found to create separate arrangements 
governing chains, shadowing and nested around statutory and customary 
structures. It was often run in parallel by the same governors (Angwafo 2014). 
Corruption in practice ranged from additional payments ‘to get things done’ 
in business, to elites engaging in state and power capture, and as a deliberate 
strategy of clientelism by state officials and traditional authorities. Corruption 
persists despite periodic anti-corruption campaigns in forestry and state affairs, 
initiated by powerful international institutions (Topa et al. 2009) or state elites. 
When formal regulations and bureaucracy were unknown, unclear, or unenforced, 
this created openings for corruption. When corruption becomes institutionalised, 
it operates as another governance layer (c.f. Schure 2013). As elites also often 
have traditional roles, customary rules were also corrupted. Whilst frequently 
expected, corruption was often unpredictably applied, affecting how, when, where, 
and at which costs transactions take place in chains. This concerned access to 
markets (transport to markets and ports, and obtaining market places) and access 
to resources (obtaining land titles, permits and waybills; operating without such 
permits, and harvest in protected areas). 
3.7. Governance arrangements in eight NTFP chains 
This section highlights how these governance arrangements operate in the chains. 
Eru: The leaves of two similar forest lianas found in the humid forest 
ecoregion provide a nutritious and popular vegetable increasingly traded across 
Central Africa and globally in the last twenty years. The majority is wild harvested 
with around 80% of harvest from open-access primary and secondary forests. 
Since 2005 eru has been classed as a Special Forestry Product (see statutory 
arrangements section). In 1995 eru was declared as an endangered species and 
a ban was considered but never implemented. However trading and exporting 
without permits is common. Customary rules requiring permission in open access 
forests vary by village. Around 40% of traders, exporters and retailers were 
union members, with strong rules governing market access, prices and practices. 
Although IUCN Red data listed, this listing has not impacted trade. Projects 
promoted cultivation and processing over the last 20 years, with little impact. 
Corruption is rife in issuing permits and during transport within Cameroon and to 
Nigeria, valued at up to 25% of costs. 
A fine mess: bricolaged forest governance in Cameroon 11
Apiculture: The production of bee-based products such as honey, wax, 
propolis and by-products (creams, cosmetics, medicines and wines) was 
statutory unregulated until 2007. Laws relating to processing existed but 
were not enforced. Traders developed standards with the government to 
allow exports for companies and products with a permit. Voluntary in name, 
compliance is essential to enter the European market. Quality standards 
have been discussed in the chain since 2008, but have not been formalised. 
Customary rules were weak in the savannah ecoregion, in contrast to the many 
rules governing access and forest management in the montane ecoregions. 
Since 2006 market-based governance arrangements have been introduced. 
Organic and fair trade certification was set up in the savannah ecoregion by 
a Cameroonian company, Guiding Hope. The African Intellectual Property 
Office, CIRAD, Guiding Hope and the Kilum Ijim White Honey Association 
set up geographic indication in the montane Oku forest. These initiatives 
resulted in rules governing the chain from harvest to retail. In the montane 
ecoregions 41%, and in savannah ecoregion 21% of beekeepers were members 
of project-initiated groups, often engaging in processing and trading. At least 
fifteen projects over the last two decades have supported collective action, 
hive building, processing, forest regeneration and setting up community 
forests. Many traders bribe government agents to minimise bureaucracy and 
transport costs, and to secure access to government support. 
Pygeum: This tree’s bark is used locally in the montane ecoregion where it 
grows for medicines, and is exported internationally for use in health products 
and pharmaceuticals. The timber is used for fuel and carving and the flowers 
are melliferous (honey-producing). A plethora of local and national regulations 
have covered bark harvest since 1974, and it is a special forestry product. 
Customary regulations govern access to forests, combined with collective and 
hybrid arrangements such as community forests. However, these were generally 
weakly enforced and some of the worst cases of overexploitation have been in 
community managed forests (Ingram and Nsawir 2007; Ingram 2014). The bark 
Photo 1: National meeting of beekeepers in Cameroon, Ngaoundal, Adamaoua region, August 
2010.
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is IUCN Red listed and CITES Appendix II listed, as possibly threatened with 
extinction unless trade is controlled through annually agreed quotas and long-
term management plans. Despite years of projects and programmes providing 
evidence, inventories and techniques, the government’s failure to implement 
such plans led to a three-year trade suspension in 2007. High demand and value 
has led to increased cultivation over the last 40 years. Stakeholders along the 
chain then collaborated to develop a national management plan and conduct 
inventories, supported by more projects. Despite all the regulations and 
arrangements illegal over-exploitation was rife from 2000 to 2007, exacerbated 
by corruption and the newly formed community forests, which eased access to 
resources and markets. 
Cola: The pink and white nuts are given as tokens of hospitality, chewed as a 
stimulant and used in cola-based drinks. Around 90% of harvest in the montane 
ecoregions is from cultivated or actively managed trees,5 and 10% from montane 
secondary, gallery and community forests. Statutory regulations do not address 
cola nuts. Customary arrangements dominate, arising from at least two centuries 
of high economic and cultural value. Strong ethnic ties link traders from the 
montane ecoregion to the Extreme North region where the nuts were traded. 
These informal, trust- and market-based arrangements enable long distance, 
trans-national trade, dispute settlement, financial support and information sharing. 
Corruption was common with traders and transporters paying bribes at roadblocks 
and border crossings.
Bush mango: The nuts from this tree found in humid lowland forests 
are pressed for their oil, sold dried or processed into a paste. They are used 
locally as medicine and food, being the main ingredient in popular sauces in 
Cameroon and neighbouring countries. They have been increasingly exported 
to the USA and Europe for use in weight-loss aids and cosmetics. On average 
41% is harvested from farm-fallows in the humid ecoregion; the remainder 
is from secondary and primary lowland forests. Although not classed as a 
Special Forestry Product, bush mango has been covered by agreement permits. 
Customary tenure and ownership dominate governance arrangements. Market-
based arrangements were common, with well-known trading norms. Projects 
changed harvest rules in the Takamanda National Park, introducing new co-
management arrangements. Most traders do not know or have difficulty 
obtaining permits and operate illegally. Corruption at checkpoints and border 
crossings by police, forestry, customs, council, trade and quarantine officers is 
prevalent, amounting to 24% of costs. 
Raffia products: different parts of raffia palms provide over 30 construction, 
food and cultural products. Most are traded on a small scale, except palm wine 
which has a vibrant local trade. Raffia has been domesticated for centuries in the 
montane ecoregions, where it is managed in riverine gallery forest areas. Around 
5
 See Wiersum et al. (2013) for definitions of arrangements controlling access to resources.
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80% of products in the chain are harvested from customarily owned land and 
20% from privately owned land. Access is thus primarily governed by customary 
arrangements, whereas access to markets is not officially regulated and subject to 
well-established market rules.
Bamboo: Montane alpine and savannah bamboos is used and traded locally as 
the source of numerous tools, utensils, construction materials (including beehives) 
and fuel. Most (57%) bamboo was naturally regenerating, 6% was planted, and 
37% originated from natural generation and planting. There was no statutory 
regulation addressing bamboo. However, Alpine bamboo has been subject to 
prefectural orders forbidding harvesting young shoots, updated and enforced by 
project and customary rules. In the montane ecoregions traditional regulations 
predominated, less so in savannah. Voluntary, market-based arrangements 
commenced in 2011 in the savannah ecoregion as beekeeping groups sought to 
replant and protect bamboo groves. 
Gum arabic: Resin from three species is used locally, and the trees also 
provide fuelwood and animal forage. The gum is also exported for use in foods, 
paints and pharmaceuticals. Around 96% originates from open access savannah 
and the Waza National Park, and 4% from enriched forest plantations set up 
by state projects. Around 3% of harvesters belong to groups and four major 
exporters belong to a trade association. In 2006 an interprofession6
 was set up 
by projects to bring actors together to address quality, price and availability 
problems. Although listed as a special forestry product, a substantial proportion is 
exported illegally. The legal status of the now unmanaged, degraded plantations 
is ambiguous. Despite projects working to make customary harvesting in the park 
legal and create adjacent community forests, these agreements have not formally 
been implemented, and the same applies to sustainable harvest and management 
guidelines.
3.8. Scoring the governance arrangements
The scoring system enables the governance arrangements and their intensity to be 
made explicit. Figure 2 illustrates the ‘fine mess’ of arrangements in the chains. 
Not all arrangements were equally present in each chain and there were variances 
in intensity between arrangements. These differences occur despite the NTFPs 
being subject to the same national regulatory framework and business operating 
environment. However, the socio-economic context is different in each ecoregion, 
so that the geographical origin of the resources and market location explains 
some differences – particularly in customary arrangements. Product values and 
characteristics, and chain history also explain some of the differences. Economic, 
and to some extent socio-cultural values, influence the number and type of 
governance arrangements, with high-value chains having more arrangements and 
a greater intensity of arrangements governing access to resources and to markets.
6
 Chain platform organisation recognised by the government. 
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All chains had multiple, plural governance arrangements. However their 
intensity varied widely. The pygeum, apiculture and eru chains were the most 
intensely governed chains. Whilst there were no absolute voids, there were voids 
of specific arrangements. For example, Figure 2 makes visible that there were 
no formal regulations in the bamboo, raffia and cola chains. The intensity and 
pluralism reflect the specific ecoregion and socioeconomic context, product 
values and characteristics. Regulatory, project and market-based systems 
arrangements were combined, with legitimation for new arrangements often 
sought by juxtaposing them with pre-existing customary arrangements. Actors 
bricolaged new arrangements by adapting and reshaping customary and voluntary 
arrangements. Alternatively, they circumvented statutory arrangements by bribery. 
These processes occurred as direct and indirect actors responded to changes in 
the social context, and in product value and demand, largely to secure access to 
resources and markets.
The pygeum, eru, bush mango and gum arabic chains were regulated under 
the special forestry products permitting system. These statutory governance 
arrangements were scored highly as their institution, rules and boundaries were 
known and they were horizontally nested. They were largely seen as having 
accountability and moral grounding due to their statutory nature, which also makes 
the location of decision-making clear for most actors. However, a paradox emerges 
with strong scoring arrangements being dysfunctional due to limited monitoring 
and generally low compliance. Rules are generally weakly and arbitrarily enforced 
with few sanctions. This reduces the total score for the latter three chains. 
Location- and culturally specific customary regulations governed all the 
chains. They predominantly regulate access to resources. They tended to be 
stronger in the remote areas. They have become weaker with improved access to 
markets, immigration, decreased dependence of forest-adjacent communities on 
forest resources and increasing pressure (and conflicts) over these resources. Few 
customary regulations governed markets (which products can be sold and how). 
The markets were often in different geographical locations with different governors. 
Voluntary and market-based arrangements were pervasive in all the chains. 
They affected prices, activities, types and timing of transactions, and quality. They 
generally focussed on access to markets, using mechanisms to enhance access or 
control by specific actor groups and/or enhance their power, whilst limiting or 
excluding access for others. 
Involuntary standards covered half of the chains. In the pygeum and apiculture 
chains they enhanced and legitimated statutory and project-based governance 
arrangements. Overall, however, they tended to be poorly known.
Project rules, due to the highly geographically specific projects activities , were 
only recognised by a few actors, many mistaking them for statutory regulations. 
They were strongest in the pygeum, apiculture and gum arabic chains. 
Corruption influences all chains, varying in intensity by chain. In the high 
volume, high value and highly statutorily regulated chains such as pygeum and 
eru, corruption flourished in parallel to formal laws. It also occurred where no 
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statutory framework operates, such as the cola chain, due to its systemic nature in 
Cameroon and the countries to which the chain flows. In raffia and bamboo chains 
it is relatively low. 
Most of the arrangements did not cover the whole value chain. Control of access 
to resources and access to markets were generally separated. Harvesting, market 
sales, transport and export were governed by different arrangements and actors. 
Only the pygeum and the apiculture chains had coherent arrangements governing 
the entire chain, due to regulatory changes and organic certification respectively.
Legitimacy scores are illustrated in Figure 3. Customary arrangements have 
the highest levels of legitimacy compared to other arrangements and were most 
prevalent in rural, forest areas. These arrangements excluded access to resources 
on the basis of social-cultural capital and personal characteristics such as sex, 
age, familial and societal status, allowing actors meeting certain conditions to 
benefit. Customary traditions are less legitimate in urban areas, for migrants 
and ‘outsider’ harvesters. Voluntary, market-based arrangements score second 
highest as legitimate. This can be explained as collective arrangements are mostly 
controlled by direct actors, such as in the eru and honey chains. Unions and 
associations restrict access to markets on the basis of membership. They benefitted 
those involved by securing their access to resources and/or markets, enabling 
higher and more stable prices. Statutory regulations have the third highest level 
of legitimacy. Legitimacy is diminished by corruption and exclusion due to low 
knowledge about rights, for example, concerning subsistence harvesting and 
permits. However, arbitrarily enforced statutory laws are viewed as illegitimate, 
serving a small group of elites, a view shared by Mvondo-Assembe (2009). By 
using their social and political capital, actors benefitted financially from their 
knowledge of rights and procedures, resulting in higher incomes and avoiding 
corruption.
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Figure 3: The legitimacy of governance arrangements.
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4. Discussion
This section discusses the implications of governance figurations for the 
sustainability of livelihoods and NTFP management in the eight NTFP chains in 
Cameroon.
4.1. Implications of plural, overlapping and segmented governance 
arrangements for sustainable livelihoods
Governance arrangements generally focus on only some chain activities, generally 
access to NTFP resources or access to markets (see Wiersum et al. 2013). This 
separation has both positive and negative impacts on the livelihoods of actors 
along the chain and for their sustainability. 
Well-defined, well-known, enforced and functioning arrangements and 
institutions provide a clear framework allowing actors to operate with security. This 
is particularly important for NTFP production and trade which inherently bear risks 
that need to be managed. These include susceptibility to overharvesting, seasonality 
and fluctuating harvest volumes. These factors make it difficult to estimate 
sustainable harvest volumes. Customary arrangements governing access to the cola 
and raffia chains, market-based arrangements in the eru and bush mango chains, 
and project arrangements in the apiculture and bush mango chains seek to address 
this problem. Voluntary market-based systems such as geographic indication and 
organic certification, have a similar impact. They explicitly link demand with 
supply, controlling access and harvesting methods. They create non-tangible product 
characteristics and value, using sustainable sourcing as a selling point. 
However, weak arrangements are counterproductive to sustainable 
livelihoods. For example the inconsistency and arbitrariness with which formal 
regulations were implemented and enforced make an unclear playing field for 
access to and trade in NTFPs. This encourages short-term practices and over-
exploitation. Whilst profitable livelihoods were possible in the short term, as 
in the case of eru (Ingram et al. 2012) and pygeum (Ingram and Nsawir 2007), 
the increasing scarcity and vulnerability of these resources in the wild indicates 
that these chains are not sustainable in the longer term (Ingram 2012, 2014). 
Harvesters and owners respond by seeking greater control over the resource, 
for instance through domestication and cultivation and/or the introduction 
or enforcement of governance arrangements. This has been observed in the 
pygeum, raffia, cola and honey chains. Sustainability of livelihoods can also 
be undermined by project arrangements that – despite being well-known on a 
local level – were not well-nested and have a short-term duration. This creates 
uncertainty and adds to actor’s costs of complying with and investing in project-
based institutions, the result being that chain governance changes when projects 
end. Similar findings have been reported about Integrated Conservation and 
Development Projects (ICDPs) and REDD+ schemes (e.g. Blom et al. 2010). 
Project arrangements, in contrast, often complicate the institutional landscape by 
creating their own rules.
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Unless governance arrangements ensure that the natural capital resource 
base is not undermined, the cases indicate that it is unlikely that long-term 
sustainable livelihoods and chains are obtained. Chain booms and busts occur 
as NTFP resources are harvested, deteriorate in abundance, become less 
exploited and then recuperate over time, leading to livelihood shocks and 
stresses. The international pygeum chain with its three-year trade suspension 
following high levels of harvests illustrates such negative impacts, mirroring 
NTFPs such as rubber (Weinstein 1983). In the apiculture, cola and raffia 
chains in contrast, busts have been avoided and long-term, secure livelihoods 
and sustainable chains have been maintained (Ingram 2014). This has been 
achieved through long-established customary arrangements, involving highly 
managed customary production systems, restricted tenure and resource access, 
and cultivation.
The segmented nature of how NTFP chains are governed has negative 
implications for sustainable livelihoods. Arrangements with vertically nested 
governance institutions are as important as horizontal nesting. This reflects 
institutional design principles (Ostrom 1990; Scott 2001; Agrawal and Chhatre 
2006; Cox et al. 2010). Voluntary, market-based arrangements, as in the apiculture 
chain, allow better vertical integration and institutional nesting. They also 
explicitly try to balance demand and supply, creating more sustainable livelihoods 
and chains. This reflects the notion of chain of custody certification as a way of 
making trade sustainable (Shanley et al. 2008). 
The extent to which arrangements impact livelihoods and sustainable resource 
management depends partly upon their legitimacy for chain actors, and thus 
adherence. This finding mirrors that of other studies (van Kersbergen and van 
Waarden 2004; Cotula et al. 2007). Repressive systems may result in high levels 
of compliance out of fear and high levels of enforcement rather than legitimacy.
4.2. Bricolage as a strategy to cope with fragmented governance 
arrangements 
Participating in and complying with multiple arrangements has additional costs 
for direct chain actors. Many can ill-afford such costs, given the high incidence 
of poverty. However, the overlaps, voids and coverage of only a part of the chain 
activities also create opportunities. Well-illustrated by the apiculture chain, direct 
actors have grabbed control by vertically integrating multiple chain activities. This 
allows them to better control the resource, to respond to, and even create demand 
by introducing new products, Voids result in easy entry to chains, enabling actors 
to generate income and to bricole responses to improve their livelihoods. Overlaps 
mean that actors can ‘shop’: participating and complying with arrangements best 
suiting their own mix of capitals and situation, exemplified by harvesters and 
exporters in the pygeum chain. In the apiculture chain, actors created new market-
based arrangements, as none suitable existed, or were of low intensity. The eru, 
pygeum bark and apiculture product chains show that institutions are created as 
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new strategies to reduce vulnerabilities in access to resources. They are often 
exclusionary, as actors seek to take control of parts of a chain and exclude others, 
sometimes temporarily. They do so by creating competitive advantage and/or 
by adding value to various assets. This is particularly the case when customary 
institutions control no further than local markets and are slow or not amenable to 
change; when products become more widely traded; or when statutory institutions 
are fragile, weak, unenforced and/or corrupt. 
Hence, actors make the best of the arrangements in which they find 
themselves, and creatively use capitals available. They build on social and natural 
capital to construct new governance arrangements and/or remould existing 
ones aiming to meet their current objectives, circumstances and livelihoods. 
Some direct actors, particularly harvesters and retailers, have had little or no 
voice in formal governance arrangements – however, when able (depending 
upon their mix of assets) they have acted, particularly collectively, to create 
their own messy arrangements. Some powerful traders, alone or also in trade 
associations, have had a voice in formal governance arrangements, notably in 
the pygeum and apiculture chains where they have worked to introduce and 
amend statutory regulations. They have collaborated with indirect actors such 
as NGOs, development organisations and researchers to support their aims. This 
‘creative crafting’ of governance arrangements in weak governance situations 
has been reported in Tanzania and Zimbabwe (Cleaver 2002, 2012) and Bolivia 
(de Koning 2014).
The result of this bricolage is a ‘fine mess’ of arrangements governing these 
products and their chains. This seems unlikely to be smoothed into a mono-
governance system anytime in the near future. Land and regulatory reforms have 
been slow, whilst customary rulers still cling to power in the remoter mountain 
tops, deep forest and remote savannah villages, and the culture of corruption 
and ‘big men’ remains pervasive. The effectiveness of customary laws varies 
significantly. It is generally strongest in remoter, less accessible, rural and forest-
based communities and for high value products, and weakest when undermined 
by factors such as proximity to urban centres with growing populations, with high 
levels of cultural and social change and multiple ethnic groups (Colfer et al. 2011).
4.3. Strategies for sustainable livelihoods
The continued failure of formal, statutory institutions to enforce rules that ensure 
the sustainability of highly valued, traded products has been a major challenge 
for many actors in the chains. Actors have sought control when high value 
products become scarce. This could be the result of rising demand (sometimes 
dramatic such as in the case of eru and pygeum), deforestation, degradation 
and over-harvesting. Cultivation, mainly under customary and collective 
(community forest) governance regimes, is one of the most common strategies 
used. In the ancient chains such as honey, cola nuts and raffia wine, actors in the 
chain have increased cultivation and associated governance systems to secure 
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supply. However, for high-value, high-demand products, institutional designs 
that assure sustainable governance have barely been able to keep pace. This 
is particularly true for species for which their ecology, parts used and harvest 
method makes them vulnerable to over-exploitation. Thus the majority of the 
gum arabic and eru trade based on wild harvested products is unsustainable 
(Madi et al. 2010; Ingram 2014). Market-based, collective action has also been 
used by direct actors seeking to increase their power and control to ensure 
product quality, reduce corruption, reassure consumers, enable partnerships, 
access finance and technical support, control trade – ultimately to secure their 
livelihoods. Collective action is enabled and strengthened by shared geographic 
location, kinship and ethnic ties.
In general, the NTFP sector is largely invisible and direct actors largely 
‘silent’ in the sense that their voice is little heard in policymaking or business 
circles. The ability of harvesters and traders to significantly influence business 
bottlenecks, such as access to formal credit and banking institutions, is weak. This 
finding is similar to forest product chains in other countries (e.g. Macqueen et 
al. 2006). However, modest changes resulted from participatory action research, 
development projects and collective action. These enabled harvesters and traders 
to have more voice and visibility in the apiculture chain. The honey chain, where 
actors jointly developed sector-wide standards and a new policy on honey exports, 
and the pygeum chain, where actors joined to counter the 2007 trade suspension, 
are examples. In the eru and bush mango chains, collective action bolstered the 
negotiating position of harvesters and traders with the government concerning 
permits.
5. Conclusions
This paper addressed the question of what governance configurations control eight 
NTFP chains originating from Cameroon and how these affect the sustainability 
of livelihoods, trade and resource management. The analysis showed that multiple 
governance arrangements are a reality. A reliance or focus upon just one system, 
such as statutory regulation as the main vehicle for governance is unrealistic given 
the current socio-political and economic context in Cameroon. Complementary, 
plural arrangements have filled voids by providing bundles of rights and 
responsibilities that govern a species, its ecological niche, and the activities 
in a chain. Crafting sustainable chains depends on the current patchwork of 
arrangements, and the ability, resourcefulness and power of actors to ‘bricole’ new 
governance arrangements or replace ineffective institutions, such as corruption, 
with more effective and sustainable ones. Project interventions have enhanced 
and changed actors’ power, but the intricate constellations in chains can make 
outcomes difficult to predict.
Institutional bricolage allows a broad exploration through different lenses that 
reflect the reality of these research subjects. Emerging, ‘bricolaged’ arrangements 
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offer glimmers of hope and opportunity that can reconcile both development/
livelihood and conservation agendas. Combinations of project-based, statutory 
and market-led arrangements that promote, support and encourage cultivation, 
and build on customary knowledge and rules, have been effective in creating 
‘win-wins’. However, these tend to be exclusive – such as the cola, raffia and gum 
arabic chains – restricting access to certain ethnic groups or sexes. Information 
sharing, role models, capacity building and training have helped overcome this, 
bringing and resulting from social-cultural changes, the long term implications of 
which also remain to be seen. Recent experiments such as in the pygeum chain 
show promise. For this chain a new statutory system was developed, drawing on 
successful project-based institutions, building on collective action and customary 
rules, and borrowing from agricultural and forestry governance models. Similarly, 
voluntary market standards that cover the entire chain, like organic certification 
and geographic indication in the honey chain, seem to hold promise for achieving 
win-win outcomes. However, as these are still recent and embrace a small number 
of people, their efficacy remains to be tested.
What is clear in this ‘mess’ is that the outcomes and impacts of institutional 
design are extremely difficult to predict in the short term. Getting into the mess 
is essential to enhance understanding of sustainable chains and livelihoods. The 
findings highlight the need to understand the impact of multiple arrangements and 
configurations all along a value chain, and how they control access to resources 
and markets. This provides insights into the implications for livelihoods as well 
as for the sustainability thereof.
Avenues for further inquiry include refining the governance intensity 
scoring method, prior to testing on other chains and contexts. Improvements 
include getting actors to rate intensity directly, rather than implicitly drawing on 
interviews and explicitly on expert consultation. The language and terms used 
need to be formulated so as to be clear for all actors in the chains. Additional 
criteria to measure the level of integration of access to resources and to markets 
in arrangements should also be included. Refinements could be made to analysing 
how corruption affects the performance of governance arrangements.
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